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I. Background
The prolonged, two-year reconciliation conference held in Kenya and
the resulting interim administration, implemented under the dominant
tutelage of Ethiopia, are generally considered to have failed to live up
to the expectations of the Somali people. The state structure was built
on the foundation of a clan power segregation system known as 4.5
(four-point-five). This means the separation of the Somali people into
four clans that are equal and, as such, pure Somali, against an amalgamation of various clans and communities that are unequal to the first
group and, hence, considered “impure” or less Somali. The lumping
together of all the latter communities is regarded as equivalent only to
a half of the share of a clan.
In spite of the inherent segregation and marginalization, some scholars of Somali society, like historian Mohamed H. Mukhtar, believe that
the apartheid-like 4.5 system is an “important accomplishment.”1 In a
book chapter titled “Somali Reconciliation Conferences: The Unbeaten
Track,” Mukhtar chronicles this episode as one of various “success stories”2 that have emerged from the Sodere factional meeting of 1997. As
the historian posits it, this could be called an achievement, particularly
considering the fact that “for the first time Somali clans agreed about
their relative size, power and territorial rights.”3 Then the professor
emphasizes that, “the conference also recognized another segment of
the Somali society which included minority groups not identified with
one of the above clans, i.e., the Banadiris and the Somali Bantus, just to
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mention some.”4 In what is a concluding thought, he sounds more firm
in his suggestion and writes, “After Sodere, the question of clan composition of any future Somali ‘conference’ should not be a problem.”5
Despite our high esteem for Mukhtar, we must elucidate a different
version of the 4.5 factor, which, unlike his opinion, brings to the surface sharp disagreement and displeasure from certain communities.
To do so, we will quote contrasting views by other scholars as well as
notable Somalis from various kin-affiliations who have criticized and
denounced the 4.5 method as a divisive technique; one which is perceived to be unharmonious to the tenets of equality and mutual coexistence among the diverse communities in the country. In addition, one
of the authors (Mohamed Eno) was an official participant in the conference while Omar Eno (the co-author) paid several visits, studying the
nature of the conference and particularly interviewing participants
on their view regarding the 4.5 system. To this effect, the writers also
conducted two workshops at Sports View Hotel in Kasarani, on the
outskirts of Nairobi, on separate occasions, and made a video film of
the discussions that ensued.
II. Contentions about the 4.5 Formula
Mukhtar’s discourse should be analyzed from varying perspectives
in order to get at the value of the essay, examining points that might
contradict what he actually intended. From the outset, the 4.5 system
represents absolute discrimination and severe ethnic marginalization.
Upon its introduction as an instrument for power sharing, the affected
communities protested against it forthwith as well as in many other
forums, and indeed continue to do so to this day.
Apart from the Bantu Jareer voices of protest, non-Jareer and concerned Somali groups of various kin-identities and social backgrounds
have proactively analyzed the magnitude of the bigotry underpinning
the 4.5 clan system. We introduce these views with the account given
by Fatun Mohamed Hassan and Abdalla Hirad who, as early as October 2002, expressed how visionary sections of the society “have disagreed with the so-called ‘4.5-formula,’ which they feel leaves out the
‘Jareer Weyn’ as a major clan in Somalia.”6 In their argument, Hassan
and Hirad contend:
It is our strong belief that ‘clanism’—which is the value that the so-called
‘4.5-formula’ could only, and would definitely, encourage—is almost
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always counterproductive…the ‘4.5-formula’ should never be used to
account for the principle of ‘equitability,’ which is—must be—the basis
for the distribution of political power, economic benefits and development resources in the future of Somalia.7

In their view, Hassan and Hirad sum up the 4.5 principle as one that,
“is not definitely a smart approach to running the affairs of a state.”8
Another Somali commentator, Mohamed Abdullahi, argues, “The
4.5-clan formula has no base in Somali reality.”9 Abdullahi does not see
the clanist arrangement as a solution to the Somali impasse. Although
Mukhtar acknowledges the 4.5 system as a unique accomplishment
(convenient for running state affairs), analysts like John Prendergast
suggest that, despite the wide representation of the major clans in the
new Parliament, “the transitional government in its current form concentrates power and positions in the hands of some constituencies and
clans while marginalizing or excluding others.”10
The Gabooye/Baidari community protested with a strong and loud
voice against this Apartheid-like formula. In a long statement of condemnation (copied to the United Nations, several European embassies,
the United States, and a number of international organizations), the
Supreme Council of the community denounced the social segregation blueprint as a “neo-colonialist tool…an oppressive formula.”11
The community dismisses it because it “will only entrench evil; and
to show support for this formula is to express support for the continuance of oppression.”12
As one of the contributors to the 4.5 forum, Mahad Sheikh laments,
“The parliament is based on the [abhorred] clan formula 4.5. Ministers
are elected on clan allegiance.”13 In his view, the “despised 4.5 tribal
power sharing is a system that is designed [by] and [for] a few among
the society that are unqualified to govern.”14 Sheikh does not hesitate
to categorize it as “a mockery to the democratic nation-state”15 and
even “genocidal.”16
Other Somalis have similarly deplored the decisions encouraging
the discriminative policy, including author Omar Eno who, on various
occasions and with other protestors on Voice of America, denounced
it as “nothing but discrimination.”17 In the same panel discussion with
Omar, Abdiaziz Mukhtar (Qariidi), an able analyst of Somali politics in
the Barre and post-Barre periods, proposed that 4.5 was conceived by
Hawiye/Darod elders and an exercise “based on discrimination.”18
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III. Contrasting Scholars’ Analysis of the 4.5 Formula:
Abdi Samatar vs. Mohamed Mukhtar
Contrary to Mukhtar’s notion of the 4.5 clan power-sharing formula
and clan federalism as an accomplishment, leading Somali scholar
and professor of Geography and Global Studies, Abdi Ismail Samatar,
defines the recipe as “compartmentalized political order.”19 Detailing
the intrinsic bias and adverse consequences grounded in this approach,
Samatar views the 4.5 formula not as a solution, but instead as a balkanizing strategy “driven by rent-seeking (corruption) rather than providing an efficient service to the citizens.”20
Mukhtar does not reveal whether what he wrote represents his own
personal view or whether it is a reflection of the sentiments of his
kin-group or any of his informants. His article is short on providing
sources to that effect. It is obvious, nonetheless, that Mukhtar’s and
Samatar’s arguments are based on two divergent “realities” that represent the attitudes of the Somali people towards the 4.5 power-sharing
formula.
The contention, it seems to us, is bi-focal and needs to be looked
at from the angle of: (a) a section of the population that seems to find
legitimacy in this concept, and (b) an opposing segment of the same
society that finds fault in the nature of the concept itself. Here lies the
central difference between Mukhtar and Samatar.
Although we belong to the view characterizing the 4.5 phenomenon as a misleading and pernicious concept that could only yield
marginalization of important communities, Samatar’s argument draws
much-needed attention to the dispensation itself and the consequences
for leadership and governance. On the other hand, Mukhtar’s position suggests that the 4.5 clan classification is necessary. This might
be partly explained by the nature of what Mukhtar’s community has
been through: as a community counted earlier among those slighted
by the other three groups with whom it has now been made equal. The
point had previously compelled Mukhtar to describe his Digil-Mirifle community as “Silent Sufferers.” Because the Reewing have now
been “promoted” to equal status with their former marginalizers, the
learned historian seems to have quickly forgotten the pain of discrimination and, thus, finds comfort now in the 4.5 system. Furthermore, by
celebrating this arrangement as a sound measure for distribution of the
portfolios of the state, Mukhtar seems to have chosen to disdain the
plight of those who continue to suffer, not only under the three groups,
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but what has now become four due to the inclusion of Mukhtar’s Reewing kin-group.
Our argument is that it is better to propose a concept that does
not rob any group of its honor. What the 4.5 system offers is a mere
continuation of the injustice to the other section of what used to be a
constituent part of Mukhtar’s “Silent Sufferers.” To put it another way,
that which is not based on justice will always be a breeding ground
for future trouble. In comparison, Professor Samatar condemns the 4.5
formula as a strategy that, “has no chance of leading to political stability and economic development.”21 He went so far as to criticize it in a
Somali seminar in Lenana House in Nairobi, describing its dehumanizing divisiveness and tendency towards “clanocracy” rather than meritocracy. For Samatar, “The charter grounds public affairs on genealogy
rather than common citizenship.”22
Samatar’s argument rests on direct observations from the field.23 He
was present during the crucial debates and discussions when the marginalized communities were pushing their case against the discrimination embedded in the 4.5 formula and contesting the myth of the
existence of four major clans. In contrast, Mukhtar’s reasoning is based
on the assertion that “the Sodere participants agreed that there are
four major equal clans.”24 Because it was agreed in Sodere by certain
participants, Mukhtar wants us to believe that the 4.5 formula cannot
be challenged. This somewhat ill informed rationale makes axiomatic
a decision concocted by tribalists, some of them even participants in
gruesome violations of human rights.
Whereas Mukhtar presents a summation of the 4.5 system as an
indisputable formula agreed upon by credible delegates, Samatar’s perspective is enriched by the insights gained from his intimate encounters with the social emotions of the participants at the conference, and
particularly members of communities that feel undervalued. Hence,
his study “derives particularly from symbolic interactionism,”25 by
providing “experiences in real situations.”26 The nature of his analysis
concurs with social science methodologists like Wellington, that qualitative data is best “collected in a real-life, nature setting.”27
Despite our respect for Professor Mukhtar as a learned compatriot,
we must assert the fact that his thinking deliberately discounts the
rightful claims of equality of those he refers to as “another segment
of the Somali society which included minority groups.” After reporting what the “four major clans” have “agreed to” in Sodere, Ethiopia,
and Arta, Djibouti, he does not provide a balanced study that portrays
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the contrasting views related to the 4.5 issue. As a substitute, Mukhtar
chooses to contaminate scholarship with ethnocentrism, implying that
as long as the Digil-Mirifle (Sab) kin confederacy is elevated to equal
status with their former marginalizers, the Samale, the Sodere conception of the 4.5 formula is a worthy accomplishment and should,
therefore, be accepted as it is. Upon introduction of the 4.5 system, the
Dir group, which represented many northern Somalis, immediately
pulled out of the conference and adamantly rejected the 4.5 formula.
Unlike the Dir, though, the southern Digil/Mirifle clan, which was
supposed to be “paesano” with the so-called “minorities,” enthusiastically embraced the apartheid system. This perception leaves us with
the belief that the Digil/Mirifle conveniently forgot about the similar
status that they suffered from over the years preceding their elevation
to equal status with the other three.
Telling experiences (which Mukhtar avoids acknowledging),
occurred on two different occasions at the annual African Studies
Association meetings in 2002 and 2004. One of the two authors brought
forth the unfairness of the 4.5 policy.28 He underscored the consequent
abuses—psychological, political, economic, and ethnic—inherent in it.
As a scholar, Professor Mukhtar should have been aware of the intense
heat emerging from the 4.5 debate since he, too, presented both times
in the same panel. With that reality in mind, therefore, for the history professor to suggest a nation-wide endorsement of the 4.5 system
sounds insincere, if not ethnocentric.
The issue has now become the object of emerging strong voices of
protest—voices that directly challenge Mukhtar’s bold statement that,
“clan composition of any future Somali ‘conference’ should not be a
problem.”29
By extending the topic of clan composition a bit further, and even
closer to the Mrifle-Sab constituency where the Jareer presence is heavy
but unacknowledged,30 neither Mukhtar nor any other individual can
factually and statistically determine “the numerical portrayal”31 of
even the “sub subgroup” in which they hold ascribed membership.
Here, a consideration of “rival explanations” would have been profitable.32 Scholars of the qualitative method of research advise practitioners “to look for rival or competing themes and explanations both
inductively and logically.”33 Therefore, by simply replicating what has
been known over the years about the Somali clans’ self-made concept
of the four major clans, Mukhtar overlooks the wisdom bequeathed to
us by qualitative analysis.
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IV. The Reality on the Ground
Elsewhere in the same article, Mukhtar notes that the Reewing Resistance Alliance’s liberation of Bay and Bakool “opened up a Pandora’s
Box” which, in our view, may bear multiple implications. Regardless, a
more complex Pandora’s Box might be opened sooner or later when:
a) The Jareer, masked and oppressed under the treachery of the DigilMirifle confederation, finally determine to stand independently and
as an entity with a separate identity; or
b) Accurate counting reveals the true number and significance of
the Jareer people currently under the domination of the MirifleReewing.
Professor Mukhtar’s statement about the RRA’s promise regarding
the liberation of “the last piece of the Digil and Mirifle land”34 is an
over-glorification. It is a declaration with a political motivation. For
many, at the time it was made, the real objective was to lure Jareer support for the RRA mobilization.35 After the liberation of the immediate
territory of the Mirifle-Sab (Bay and Bakool) was achieved, the full
truth was exposed.
What sounds cynical about the essay is how it at once bemoans the
aggression of “foreign” clans with whom, according to Mukhtar, the
local Digil-Mirifle people shared neither “historical common experience”36 nor “social contracts,”37 and evades the plight of the Jareer.
In this context, if the “armed militiamen whose interest and actions
placed them outside the pale of the Somali customary law,”38 have
sinned against Mukhtar’s kin-group, one wonders how he would explicate the silent occupation and marginalization of the Jareer among the
Mirifle-Reewing, or whether the alienation and derogatory epithets,
such as “boong,” “meddy,” and “Ooji,”39 used against the Jareer have
any justification in the customary law of the Mirifle-Sab or the Jileec
Digil-Mirifle portion of that community. In other words, is customary law protecting the rights of the Jareer aborigines, who admittedly
share a common historical experience and (selected) social contracts
with their Reewing counterparts, the Jileec? Social reality shows that
the Jareer are not accorded their rightful recognition. In fact, they are
treated as “outside the pale” of Mirifle-Reewing customary law. Daily
practice clearly shows that within the Reewing cluster of cultures, the
Jareer aborigines are considered lesser citizens than even the Leysaan,
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the most recent to be incorporated into the social fabric of the DigiMirifle.
A more recent and vivid prejudice etched into the customary law is
reflected in the allocation of the parliamentary representatives of the
Digi-Mirifle major clan. Of more than sixty representatives, the Jareer
were allocated less than four percent.40 Yet a numerical estimate of
the Jareer population suggests it is on par with the Jileec Mirifle-Reewin. Those of the Digil-Mirifle Boong-Bilis self-same school of thought
avoid the question of whether the allocation of parliamentary seats
and representation of this nature are grounded in another 4.5 system
within the context of the Digil-Mirifle Boong-Bilis divide. Or is there
any other statistical or categorical basis, such as the “ethnic purity” of
the Mirifle-Reewin? Or does customary law of this nature embrace the
sharing of “historical common experiences and social contracts,” as
Mukhtar wants us to believe?
It is our conclusion that ideologies of segregation and exploitation,
coupled with the ill intentions of the 4.5 clan categorization method,
are misconceptions detrimental to any creation of a justice-based
Somali society. More immediately, the Somali attitude of “use, exploit,
and dump” is long overdue for critical examination in Somali Studies.
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